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1. Introduction 
At present, any disaffected individual who feels any sort of sympathy toward a counter-
hegemonic position can easily connect with other like-minded people and be radicalized 
through the channels of the internet and of social media. Technological advancements in 
communication technology have expanded more rapidly than the means to control them, 
and as a result, all sorts of political communications have abounded in the anarchic realm 
of digital media. This paradigm has led to a plurality of political narratives of every kind 
– some coexisting, some clashing – but nonetheless all without a defined center.  
Even so, in many ways, the conditions in contemporary Europe parallel the societal ills 
of the 1920s and 1930s that the Marxist political philosopher Antonio Gramsci originally 
tried to diagnose from his prison cell in Turi. Around the globe, men and women have 
turned to political extremes, coming from sentiments of economic discontent and social 
alienation. Violence has spilled over onto the streets, actualized out of hostile political 
rhetoric. Nonetheless, in the past, such a type of social dissatisfaction remained localized 
in certain smaller groups and would be more or less contained and controlled or coopted 
by the state due to the limiting technological factors of communication. From these past 
circumstances – while the social sentiments and dissatisfactions remain the same – the 
contemporary state of affairs has completely inverted in terms of its relative localization. 
While the present societal conditions could be characterized by some as a sort of return 
to the past – an idealized and naturalized status quo – the onward-marching technological 
progression that has led to an uncensored digital media sphere has rendered such a return 
impossible.  
According to Gramsci’s understanding of cultural hegemony, this widespread 
contemporary societal contestation and discontent – especially from the side of the far 
right – should not have actualized in such a fashion. As Gramsci saw the situation, the 
power-holding forces of society, through their duumvirate control of political society 
through force and civil society through cultural hegemony, should have castrated any 
opposition that could offer any sort of existential challenge. However, this is not the case, 
and this current constellation implies three equally paradigm-shifting realities in the place 
of accepted theory: 1) now, European societies are in the midst of a hegemonic shift away 
from neoliberalism; 2) the actualization of hegemony is impossible in itself due to such 
drastic changes in technology; 3) or, hegemony itself has never been possible, and in its 
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place exists a spectrum of support between central power and multiple resistances to it, 
and only now can this process be discerned through technology itself. 
Any non-liberal political view, including far left and far right, are counter hegemonic by 
their definition in relation to the culturally hegemonic neoliberal center. However, in 
current scholarship and in Gramsci’s original understanding of the concept, counter 
hegemony continually applies only to movements from the left and how they could 
navigate through Machiavellian “wars of position” in order to displace the hegemonic 
elites, finally culminating in a revolutionary “war of maneuver” to overthrow the state or 
state-system of values, replacing it with their own. This one-sided, almost dichotomous 
understanding of hegemony as a concept cripples its critical application by ignoring any 
theoretical complexities or logical outcomes. Any hegemonic force can sympathize with 
any ideological position and exercise its power and influence over civil society regardless 
of this political or ideological affiliation, and so, the same holds true for a counter 
hegemony.  
With such a concrete background, this thesis will therefore focus on the dual character of 
media in an age in which counter hegemony has been problematized through the 
proliferation of digital media. As such, this paradigm presents a guiding research 
question: how does online media affect the ability of counter hegemony challenge to 
hegemonic control? 
The leading hypothesis to the research question can be stated simply: online media 
provides counter hegemonies with a platform to challenge directly the construction of 
cultural hegemonic narratives, resulting in consent contestation rather than consent 
production. An inverse hypothesis of this would be that counter hegemonies do not 
challenge the construction of cultural hegemonic narratives in the sphere of online media. 
However, this thesis operates under the paradigm of the first hypothesis, especially 
considering the growing influence of “alternative media” in online spheres in the past 
several years. The capabilities endowed by alternative online media have allowed counter 
hegemonic groups to operate outside of the direct influence and censorship of hegemonic 
forces. This would mean that the idea of cultural hegemony and counter hegemony exists 
in flux rather than a binary, allowing for a spectrum of thought rather than those of the 
cultural hegemony and those in opposition.   
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It is crucially important to state from the beginning of this thesis that it does not act to 
support, nor purport to represent nor to deny a Gramscian or Neo-Gramscian 
understanding of political reality. Instead, this research aims to discern what aspects of 
cultural hegemony and of Gramscian-understood cultural hegemony can still be applied 
in a completely distinct yet genetically related historical context: that of contemporary 
Italy, from which this research question is drawn and on which this hypothesis shall be 
tested.  
Italy, after all, was the country from which Gramsci drew his theoretical inspiration for 
cultural hegemony in the first place, taking his theory from the cultural, social, and 
historical experiences of the country. In addition, in Italy, the far right has surged in recent 
years – against the theoretical predictions of Gramsci – and major parties of the far right 
– namely Lega Nord (LN) and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) – have played a crucial role 
hypothetical centre right electoral coalition, with LN coming out on top of the coalition 
with over 17 percent of the overall vote in the 4 March 2018 national elections. The 
extreme far right in the form of CasaPound Italia (CPI) has taken local offices and, 
although it did not gain any seats in parliament, it still received a little under one percent 
of the overall vote in the national elections as well. With these contradictions to 
Gramscian predictions rampant within the Italian political and social landscape, Italy 
stands out as the prime candidate for preliminary study in order to discern exactly what 
processes have shifted and how cultural hegemony can be reimagined.  
One thing is clear from this current paradigm, however; the dichotomy and duality of the 
structure of cultural hegemony has become entirely more complex, complex to a point 
that cultural hegemony as a theory in its previous understanding can no longer explain 
the actual political and social realities of a world with online media. This thesis aims to 
go forward into the nebulous character of hegemony and provide an interpretation of this 
complexity in its present state. 
2. Literature Review 
Before the specifics of theory and methodology come into place, a wider understanding 
of the background and discussion of the theories used in this thesis need to be outlined in 
order to bring to light the disagreements, controversies, and consensuses in existing 
literature on the studies of cultural hegemony, the far right, and alternative media. 
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However, cultural hegemony will act as the primary guiding theory, with far right and 
media studies acting as supplements in understanding the wider theoretical constellation. 
With the provision of such a context, then and only then can a transdisciplinary theoretical 
construct be put into place and operationalized that will inform the mechanical analysis 
of this thesis.  
2.1 Cultural Hegemony and Counter Hegemony  
The main conceptual focus of this thesis is cultural hegemony, and the main source of an 
understanding of cultural hegemony comes from the seminal literature of Antonio 
Gramsci. The main question that Gramsci raised was how exactly societal elites 
manufacture societal consent, and his answer to this came through his broad theorization 
of cultural hegemony (Gramsci 1971). As the main theory discussed in this thesis, the 
intricacies of the concept will be discussed in the Conceptual and Theoretical Background 
section of this thesis. Nonetheless, the concept of cultural hegemony has inspired other 
scholars to apply Gramsci’s framework in their own historical analyses, who have been 
considered either Gramscians or Neo-Gramscians.  
However, this conceptualization of cultural hegemony did not provide a specific enough 
definition. T. J. Jackson Lears forwards that “the concept of cultural hegemony can only 
be understood within a variety of historical and intellectual contexts” and that the closest 
thing that Gramsci provided to a definition was “social consent” (Lears 1985, 568). 
Nonetheless, Lears notes the foresight of Gramsci in articulating – but not defining – 
Foucauldian discursive practice and the validation of hegemony in public discourse 
(Lears 1985, 574). Through his analysis of Gramscian thought, Lears provides a critical 
view of cultural hegemony before its definitional evolution with the Neo-Gramscians and 
shows that the concept of cultural hegemony needs a deeper definition.  
The Neo-Gramscian application of cultural hegemony came about first from Robert W. 
Cox, who pushed for a critical approach to international affairs concentrating on a 
redefinition of hegemony from the realist perspective and a refocusing on the historical 
origins of hegemony as such  (Cox 1981). Cox expanded upon this thought by later 
placing it in a Gramscian context (Cox 1983). From this background, Stephen Gill 
extrapolated Cox’s conceptual framework to further explain hegemonic neoliberalism in 
a contemporary outlook (Gill, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International 
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Relations 1993). Ted Hopf also stresses the Neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony in an 
international context, which displays the staying power of this attitude (Hopf 2013). 
However, Neo-Gramscianism does not exist as the sole extant reading of Gramscian 
thought. Esteve Morera restructures Gramscian theory in a contemporary democratic 
theoretical context. The brunt of this article stresses the distinction that consensus, in a 
Gramscian sense, is not the liberal democratic “willingness of an individual to accept 
certain views… but rather in the conditions for willingness be present” (Morera 1990, 
24). This understanding of consensus in turn informs the rest of Morera’s interplay 
between Gramscianism and democratic theory, which views even human rights discourse 
as a reproduction of culturally hegemonic societal consent. For Morera, in democracies 
“little concern [is] shown for the ideological basis of existing information” as it is 
produced in the structure of the cultural hegemony; “elitism and … the so-called truth 
does not matter at all… except to “converted intellectuals” (Morera 1990, 24-25). 
Nonetheless, the gaps in contemporary Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian theory come in 
that they both more or less ignore counter hegemonies outside of one of a conscious 
working class, whether operating in democracies or in other forms of government. This 
outlook could be remedied by looking at the conflict between the cultural hegemony and 
counter hegemony as the Foucauldian paradigm of power and resistance, as Stephen Gill 
outlines, albeit in a still Marxist prototype (Gill 2008). Taken out of this model, however, 
all social movements at the societal periphery could be considered counter hegemonic in 
their own way.  
With this background, Adam David Morton masterfully places Gramsci in a 
contemporary context, drawing both from Gramsci himself as well as Neo-Gramscians. 
Morton characterized the most important aspect of a Gramscian method as the scholar 
“thinking in a Gramscian way,” striking a balance between austere and absolute 
historicisms (Morton 2007, 18). Another striking point that Morton makes in his work is 
a warning against a transformation of the interpretation into a cause (Morton 2007, 67). 
In addition, Morton reaffirms the counter hegemonic struggle as being one against 
globally hegemonic neoliberalism, although that this struggle should not be discerned as 
something completely state-centric. Still, with his focus on Mexican leftist movements as 
the nexus of his contemporary case study, Morton unravels Gramsci much like others 
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have in this way, continuously in a Marxist/post-Marxist tradition – which is cemented in 
his concluding remarks. 
Nonetheless, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe helped to bridge this gap – albeit still 
in a post-Marxist light – by deessentializing the reductionism to the role of class and 
historical determinism in a conceptualization of hegemony, mainly from the growing gulf 
between the mass and the class that arose during the early authoritarian turn of the Soviet 
Union (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). For Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci helped to explain this 
divide by attaching leadership to “values” and “ideas” instead of just political leadership, 
with a class not taking State power, but through actually becoming the State (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 69). As such, the counter hegemonic potential not only lies in their 
economic positions but in their social relations as well (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 85).   
This being said, these Gramsci scholars and others have largely contributed to this field 
in the terms of what exactly has changed and defined cultural hegemony as a concept and 
an evolving discourse. As all constituent parts of this discourse, these understandings of 
cultural hegemony will be also included in the theoretical understanding underpinning 
this research. At the same time, the inclusion of all non-central, non-hegemonic actors – 
rather than solely the political left – to this constellation will be one of the additions of 
this thesis to this wider discourse in order to study the blind spots of past scholarship.   
2.2 The (Far) Right 
Compared to the almost century-long evolution of Gramscian thought, far right studies 
have evolved more or less over the past two decades. Central to far right studies, the 
formative far right scholar Cas Mudde forwarded a definition of the far right as nativist, 
authoritarian, and populist (Mudde 2007). Mudde’s impetus for creating such a definition 
for the radical right came from the “terminological chaos” of the 1990s and early 2000s 
wherein a lack of clear definitions existed within the scholarship of the far right, which 
would fall into a trap of situational adaptation that would fit the scholastic or ideational 
biases of the author (Mudde 2007). This definitional problem was compounded by the 
fact that “no ideological feature is shared by all parties” of the far right and, as such, this 
party family would have to represent a Weberian ideal type (Mudde 2007). The main 
difference between the far right and the extreme right comes in the former’s willingness 
to operate within liberal democratic frameworks while the later will at times stray outside 
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of this structure. Mudde’s definition seemingly has resolved this question and has 
subsequently guided scholarship, and a contending definition to the far right has not 
materialized as such.   
The main foci of far right studies, aside from a guiding definition, would be the practices 
of far right parties, especially in terms of their usage of media. Mark Fielitz and Laura 
Lotte Laloire present the contemporary paradigm amongst far right actors in the European 
political landscape, highlighting the practices of parties from Italy and wider Europe 
(Fielitz and Laloire 2016). Fielitz and Laloire stress the heterogeneity and fluctuation of 
far right actors and go on to stress that such “extra-parliamentary manifestations of the 
far right … have long-term influences on European societies” and future research, such 
as this thesis, should reflect such trends (Fielitz and Laloire 2016). 
The literature about the practices of the far right tends to remain on a case-by-case basis 
nonetheless. Heiko Koch presents a picture of CPI that both outlines the history of the 
party as well as its inherent hybridity due to its origins as a street movement (Koch 2016). 
Caterina Froio delves into the shifting narrative construction of the ‘other’ by CPI, a 
process crucial to this research (Froio 2016). Such an analysis of the narrative process of 
the far right using CPI as a case study proves invaluable in this exploration of the narrative 
production of counter hegemonies , as it could explain for any intervening factors outside 
of the global counter hegemony-local counter hegemony relationship. Samuel Bouron 
presents the practices of the Identitaire movement mirror, which many of those of CPI 
and other grassroot right wing movements that operate primarily through social and 
cultural means (Bouron 2016). As the group is “very active on the internet” and has access 
to “owning their own media,” the Identitarians had “the opportunity to issue propaganda” 
that would bypass the filter of hegemonic media outlets (Bouron 2016). Digital media as 
such has given a counter hegemon equal footing in the cultural arena. Similar literature 
on the far right provides a parallel background.  
As per existing gaps in far right literature and theory, Cas Mudde expounds upon the 
weaknesses and murky areas of contemporary far right studies and the direction that this 
scholarship needs to take. For Mudde, hypotheses have replaced theoretical assertions in 
far right studies, which are now situated within a “fourth wave” of the far right, and many 
important issues remain understudied – namely gender, media, religion, and “socio-
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cultural” factors (Mudde 2016). He reaffirms that such study should take place using 
qualitative means, steering clear from “problematic data sources” such as Eurobarometer 
and the World Values Survey (Mudde 2016). As such, this thesis will inform 
contemporary far right scholarship on this “fourth wave” through the issues of media and 
the factors of the sociocultural as well as contribute to a transdisciplinary view of the far 
right by looking at the phenomenon through a critical Gramscian lens.  
2.3 A Reading of Media 
This all being said, contemporary conceptual scholastic literature, specifically on the 
radical right within social media, remains unacceptably weak. Most of these studies focus 
too directly on the specific particularities of far right actors without providing a synthesis 
of a wider theory of the far right and digital and social media. As such, this part of the 
literature will offer the broadest possible conceptual framework for media itself within 
cultural hegemony. 
The central question in the case of media would then be a structure of how media 
functions in a Gramscian framework. David L. Altheide outlines a holistic model of how 
media functions within the context of cultural hegemony, focusing mostly on hegemonic 
media (Altheide 1984). Although looking at the arrangements of cultural hegemony in 
media in an American context, he argues that due to the structure of media from an 
institutional and resource-based standpoint, the media as a whole works to reaffirm 
preexisting societal power relations and values, making it a crucial aspect of cultural 
hegemony.  
In comparison with this explanation of media in the framework of cultural hegemony, 
Joshua Atkinson lays out a definition of alternative media, which is counter hegemonic 
in its values and goals (Atkinson 2017). For Atkinson, alternative media is alternative per 
se because it challenges existing power structures or questions the status quo. Alternative 
media also uses alternative methods in order to produce its narratives due limited 
resources and power relations, and it is nonetheless all the same dependent on the cultural 
hegemony (Atkinson 2017).  
Nonetheless, in both of these theorizations of media, instead, “social activists” or 
“political actors” could stand in the place of the radical right as an actor in itself. William 
A. Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld on the onset present this social activist – media complex 
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paradigm – albeit in a pre-social media context. Gamson and Wolfsfeld present the 
relationship of the media and the social movement as a “transaction between two 
complicated systems of actors with complex internal relationships” with varying degrees 
of “dependence on the other,” and through this symbiosis, hegemonic media acts to frame 
movements and build narratives both about these movements and current events (Gamson 
and Wolfsfeld 1993). The movements, as such, must demonstrate “value” and a “need” 
to the journalists who act as “gatekeepers” for publicity, and as such, these political actors 
and social movements depend more on the media than the inverse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993). 
Lastly, another important aspect of this work for this thesis is on the question of a 
methodological approach for the study of alternative media. Atkinson reaffirms a 
qualitative analysis for alternative media. This qualitative approach would be in place 
whether or not the researcher chooses to analyze the sources of media production (as this 
thesis will endeavor to do) or the audiences of alternative media itself. This qualitative 
analysis, paired with deductive category analysis, “reveals any themes or characteristics 
within the content and how the content should be understood within a larger context” 
(Atkinson 2017). 
The existing gaps in media studies in regards to this thesis parallel those of cultural 
hegemony and far right studies. Far right media usage remains an understudied area of 
research, and media systems understood through a Gramscian paradigm of hegemony 
have reinforced this deficiency by not including far right actors as counter hegemonic. In 
addition, a blind spot in literature on media exists in discussing the liminality between a 
hegemonic actor and a counter hegemonic one. Fundamentally, this actor-centric 
hybridity and the possibility of such will be discussed throughout the course of this thesis. 
3. Conceptual and Theoretical Background 
From the literature review, the three main concepts and guiding theories of cultural 
hegemony, far right studies, and media analysis can provide a transdisciplinary 
framework to better inform the analysis of this thesis. Both theoretical strengths and 
weaknesses of each concept will be taken in account, with any gaps from the theoretical 
structure explained through the outcomes and findings of this thesis. As such, the exact 
conceptual pieces will be considered in this section in order to present what exactly will 
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deliberated in the formation of a methodological framework and then later in the 
theoretical understanding of the results of this research. 
3.1 A Theory of Hegemony and Counter Hegemony  
This being said, the theoretical and conceptual background of this thesis relies heavily on 
a predicated understanding of Antonio Gramsci’s theorization of cultural hegemony 
based upon his writings in the Quaderni del Carcere. Gramsci’s Quaderni del Carcere – 
representing the breadth of his entire political and societal thought collected during his 
imprisonment between 1929 and 1935 – forms the entirety of his conceptualizations on 
cultural hegemony and counter hegemony. The English language translation used within 
this thesis, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and 
translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, provide Gramsci’s work a 
holistic yet focused way, a difficult task considering that these prison notebooks consisted 
of thousands of pages of unorganized thought. The section that required the most 
reordering from the fragments on “Italian History and Politics” exist as the most edited, 
and those on “Notes on Politics” were the most intact; as such, this presents a lower 
chance that the editors biased the “Notes on Politics” with their own opinions (Hoare and 
Smith 1971, xii). This is most important as Gramsci’s theorization on cultural hegemony 
– although built off his understanding of Italian history and politics – comes in “Notes on 
Politics.” 
Nonetheless, Gramsci’s own conceptual framework plays the most important role in the 
formation of his theory. Like any other scholar, Gramsci built upon the precepts and 
conceptualizations of other like-minded and contemporary scholars, and in this way, 
Italian philosopher and politician Benedetto Croce influenced many of Gramsci’s 
prototypical theories. Most central to the ideation of cultural hegemony, Croce viewed 
society as a “perpetual conflict between the Church and State,” in which the “Church” 
represents the totality of civil society, a view itself inspired by Croce’s understanding of 
civil society (Gramsci 1971, 245). Nonetheless, Gramsci posited that the “Church” in this 
case could become part of the “State” “in order to better preserve its monopoly on with 
the support of that zone of ‘civil society’ which the Church represents” (Gramsci 1971, 
245). Instrumental to the “Church” in this situation would be “the school system, and 
other institutions and activities” – namely organized religion and media (Gramsci 1971, 
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246). As a totality, organized religion, the school system, and the media as a triumvirate 
form a cultural hegemony.  
However, what exactly is the role of this cultural hegemony? Gramsci states that “every 
state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilisation and of citizen… and to 
eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others,” and the structure of 
cultural hegemony works to create the consent toward these values amongst the citizenry 
(Gramsci 1971, 246). Gramsci goes on, “the State must be conceived as an ‘educator,’ in 
as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilisation;” this education 
occurs primarily in the subjugated “Church,” the realm of cultural hegemony (Gramsci 
1971, 247). As such, the counter hegemony in the sphere of the cultural exists as all of 
those actors who oppose the values and “education” of the “State” in this way. 
Fundamentally, this presents the hegemony as a superstructure. The cultural hegemony 
of the “Church” or the civil society of organized religion, state schooling, and media form 
a priming mechanism toward societal consent toward elite values and with institutional 
political society as an alternate push from above to institutionalize the hegemony within 
society and punish those who stray from accepting these values as their own. That group 
that refuses the values of the hegemony consequentially fashions the counter hegemony.  
Gramsci, however, does not solely define the roles of the cultural hegemony in relation 
to the elites; he also directly outlines – both theoretically and philosophically – how actors 
in the form of the counter hegemony would act in such a paradigm, although his 
ideological leanings color this in a solely Marxist hue. Nonetheless, Gramsci envisions a 
type of modern “Prince,” a reconceptualization of Niccolo Machiavelli’s archetypical 
commander who “could also be a political leader whose aim is to conquer a State or to 
found a new type of State” (Gramsci 1971, 253). For Gramsci, the individuals both the 
individuals at the head of the left and the left as a whole represented this new “Prince.”1 
As compared to previous political projects, Gramsci saw this process as “neo-praxis” that 
translated into “immediate political actions” and not some sort of utopian project 
(Gramsci 1971, 248). This process happens mainly through a “war of position.”  
                                                     
1 See pages 123-202 of Gramsci 1971 for his theorized practices and behaviors for such a “Modern 
Prince.” 
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For Gramsci, the “war of position” represents the hidden struggle for the cultural realm 
that goes on outside of direct view of society. In contrast to the open “war of manouevre” 
– or open conflict between classes, i.e., hegemonic and counter hegemonic groups, which 
only lasts temporarily, this “war of position” “once won, is definitively decisive” 
(Gramsci 1971, 239). While this cultural struggle does in fact take place, evident in 
conflicting value narratives, Gramsci does not provide any reason for his theoretical 
conclusion of a “definitively decisive” war. Instead, this proclamation acts as an 
affirmation of a progressive Marxian teleology even if Gramsci himself does reject some 
points of orthodox Marxist economic determinism. Following Gramsci’s logic separate 
of this determinism, this war and seismic shift would only displace the current cultural 
hegemony, starting the process anew with a new hegemony and new counter hegemonies. 
With this in mind, this thesis will utilize Laclau and Mouffe’s deessentialized class with 
the implied consequent widening of the counter hegemony to include those socially 
opposed to the cultural hegemony.  
The crux of Gramsci’s Machiavellianism and “war of position” is that he applies it 
exclusively to Marxist actors. At the same time, this framework could equally be applied 
to other counter hegemonic actors, such as the radical and extreme right within Italy and 
Western Europe. The French Nouvelle Droite theorist Alain de Benoist has recognized 
and embraced such a view, as well as Eurasianist Alexandr Dugin in multiple 
publications, both coming from the realm of right wing political thought. In the same 
vein, the 2018 electoral campaign could be understood as a war of position of the counter 
hegemonic right against the center. As such, the praxis of the counter hegemony represent 
as a war of position in Gramscian terms without taking into account the political and 
ideological considerations – nonetheless still against the culturally hegemonic neoliberal 
global order identified by Cox, Gill, and Morton. 
In the same way, the Gramscian understanding of a top-down approach of the cultural 
hegemonic superstructure provides a robust theoretical background for its time, but its 
initial foundation ignores one simple yet crucial aspect within the degrees of hegemony 
and counter hegemony: relativity. As such, this thesis will utilize Morton’s “thinking in 
a Gramscian way,” and this type of historicization – although taking contemporary 
circumstances into account – will instead inform the theoretical basis of this thesis. 
17 
 
In addition, many aspects of cultural hegemony and counter hegemony have drastically 
changed in the eight decades since Gramsci penned his works. While the importance of 
organized religion has subsided in the global West, the importance and influence of 
education and media has increased exponentially and inversely. Technological changes 
to media and anarchic nature of digital media, which remains outside the control of both 
the State and the cultural hegemony in thrall, were nonetheless transformations that 
Gramsci did not and could not necessarily predict. This transformation has led to a 
multiplicity of spaces of unregulated, uncensored discourse that has allowed for counter 
hegemony to organize outside of interference or suppression by the cultural hegemony.  
3.2 A Definition of the Far Right 
However, without a clearly concise definition of the far right, this alternative view of 
counter hegemony could be lazily adapted in order to fit any actor on the margins of 
society – Mudde’s stated problem of “situational adaptation.” Due to the political 
connotations of the far right due to the historical case of Italy, accusations of fascism or 
the rehabilitation of fascism are often used from the center and the left in the form of 
political rhetoric. In order to navigate such a murky and politically relative discursive 
space, this definition of the far right is not just useful for further research but absolutely 
necessary. Fortunately, Cas Mudde, again, provides such a definition.  
From this paradigm, Mudde looked to circumvent a “minimum definition,” instead 
creating a maximum one based on “core concepts” (Mudde 2007, 14-15). The central 
concept that Mudde put forward for these parties was that of the nation, but this 
conceptualization of nation was further complicated by issues of civic and ethnic 
nationalism, which are not always exclusive to the far right (Mudde 2007, 16-17). From 
this problematic construct, Mudde forwards nativism as the conceptual answer, defined 
as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of 
the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are 
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.” (Mudde 2007, 19). In this 
way, the concept of nativism marries both civic and ethnic nationalism together. 
However, nativism does not exist alone in the central conceptual framework of the radical 
right, which comes together with two other key concepts: authoritarianism and populism. 
Mudde defines authoritarianism here as a “belief in a strictly ordered society, in which 
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infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde 2007, 23). However, this 
does not mean that far right actors blindly accept state authority, and “they can and will 
rebel under certain circumstances” (Mudde 2007, 23). Populism, instead, acts as an 
ideological feature that pits the “pure people” against the “corrupt elite,” with the far right 
parties representing this “pure people” through their activities (Mudde 2007, 24). 
Strikingly, economic systems do not act as “a core feature of the party family’s ideology,” 
and radical right parties can support economic agendas ranging from libertarian markets 
to welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2007, 25).  
From this trifecta of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, Mudde then goes into the 
problem of categorization of parties. While conservatives may popularly be considered 
as right wing, with their “tendencies toward “authoritarianism, traditionalism, religiosity, 
and nationalism,” they primarily seek to conserve a status quo, which is relative by 
country (Mudde 2007, 27). Nationalists and ethno-regionalists as sometimes included in 
the far right, but not always. Finally, populism does not exist solely on the right, as 
neoliberal populist and social populist parties exist as well (Mudde 2007, 29). 
Delving further into this problem of categorization, Mudde poses the question of whether 
classification should come from a researcher-defined or party-defined ideology (Mudde 
2007, 33). The names of parties do not act a good measurement due to the nebulousness 
of many of the words included, and self-identification of the parties seldom works due to 
the connotations of nativism, populism, and authoritarianism in popular discourse 
(Mudde 2007, 34-36). From this, Mudde puts forward that qualitative content analysis of 
official party literature acts as the best medium for categorizing the radical right (Mudde 
2007, 38). For Mudde, “strict coding schemes leads to conceptual rigidity, particularly 
when applied over time,” and “qualitative content analysis is a far more effective 
approach to studying phenomena like the core features of a party ideology” (Mudde 2007, 
38-39). Mudde’s “causal chain approach,” as well as his qualitative content analysis 
therefore will be operationalized in this thesis. 
Lastly, and most importantly for the specificities of this thesis, Mudde categorizes several 
Italian political parties and movements as radical right. These parties are the Alleanza 
Nazionale, Lega Nord, and Fiamma Tricolore (Mudde 2007, 56). Since Mudde’s work, 
the AN has merged with Fratelli d’Italia, the Lega Nord continues onward as a strong 
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national radical right party, and Fiamma Tricolore has split into several factions, one of 
these being CPI. All of the modern far right parties therefore parallel Mudde’s original 
classifications, and as such, this arrangement provides a basis for the inclusion of these 
parties within this thesis.  
3.3 A Theory of Media within Hegemony  
After this presentation of the concept of hegemony through Gramsci and the definition of 
the far right and the methodology through which to study it by Cas Mudde, there still 
remains one last – yet crucial – concept left to complete the tripartite theoretical 
fundament of this thesis – the media. To complete this structure and to tie together all 
constituent parts within the later methodological framework, an understanding of both 
hegemonic and counter hegemony media is necessary. 
First in this paradigm are a presentation of hegemonic media and the functions of media 
in the first place. David L. Altheide provides a solid explanation of as to why media acts 
in the interests of the ruling class and toward the reproduction of cultural hegemony. He 
shows this in giving a three-pronged analysis of what exactly forms hegemonic media 
structures. Altheide’s first point is that the socialization of journalists comes after the 
imposition of “guidelines, work routines, and orientations replete with the dominant 
ideology” (Altheide 1984, 478). In order to arrive at a point of their career during they 
would be able to report on current events – i.e., provide narratives – journalists would 
have to have already at least tacitly accepted culturally hegemonic ideological precepts.  
The second, and arguably most trenchant, point of Altheide’s framework is that 
hegemonic media covers “topics and present news reports which are supportive of the 
status quo” (Altheide 1984, Ibid.). By supporting the societal and ideological status quo, 
media does not provide any critique of the dominating cultural hegemony and therefore 
is implicitly if not directly supporting it as well.  
The last point of Altheide, due to the American background of his scholarship and object 
of research, provides a theoretical basis for this thesis only if taken with parallel 
definitions. Altheide views the media as presenting for the most part “pro-American and 
negative coverage of foreign countries” (Altheide 1984, 479). If “pro-American” can be 
taken as a proxy for pro-state then this statement could be applicable to any national case 
if broadened in such a fashion.  
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With such a broadening in mind of Altheide’s last point taken together with his other two 
theoretical assertions, RaiNews, Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A., acts as the prime exactly 
of Italian state media representative of cultural hegemony. RaiNews, considering the 
election of the majority of its board by the Italian parliament (the other two are appointed 
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance). In addition, the funding and organization for 
RaiNews come directly through the Italian state, can therefore be taken as representative 
of Italian culturally hegemonic discourse.  
However, in opposition to hegemonic media there needs to be a clear theoretical 
definition of counter hegemonic media. In this stead, a wider conceptualization of 
alternative media can be utilized as a proxy as within existing academic scholarship a 
theory of counter hegemonic media has not been developed. To this point, Joshua D. 
Atkinson has outlined both a definition of alternative media as well as an overarching 
methodology for its study. Atkinson defines certain media as alternative media “because 
of the use of language that challenged power, structures, called for sweeping social 
change, or called into question particular social roles” (Atkinson 2017, 176-177). While 
Atkinson primarily applied this definition to center of left actors, the radical right 
undoubtedly falls within the same category due to its drive for social change away from 
the current status quo. 
One of the most critical aspects of alternative media exists in the “important role of 
production” and “unconventional practices to create content” (Atkinson 2017, 177). Due 
its less privileged situation in terms of resources and power relations, alternative media 
requires a synthesis of its production and content with its audience and feedback much 
more than mainstream media does (Atkinson 2017, 180). 
However, with the study of alternative media there often exists a “fallacy of binary 
isolation” that implies that alternative media operates hermeneutically separately from 
mainstream media (Atkinson 2017, 179). In fact, the situation is the complete opposite, 
as alternative media sources “reported on issues and events that had already been covered 
in the mainstream media news” (Atkinson 2017, 191). Nevertheless, from this situation 
Atkinson presents a paradox: mainstream media is more community based in its narrative 
than alternative media even though alternative media relies on more dispersed methods 
(Atkinson 2017, 191). This situation, however, could be explained by Gramsci’s assertion 
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that the cultural hegemony promotes universalizing values in order to not threaten the 
fundaments of the societal power structure.  
4. Methodological Framework 
In mechanical terms, this thesis will conduct a single case study on the narrative 
construction of the far right in Italy in the framework of cultural hegemony, making a 
number of in-case observations on the far right parties, acting as agents of the counter 
hegemonic media and the Italian state media source of RaiNews for the cultural 
hegemony.  
Specifically, Twitter accounts and linked official websites and news sites for Lega Nord, 
CasaPound Italia, and Fratelli d’Italia will represent the counter hegemonic locality for 
the case of Italy. Inversely, the account of RaiNews will denote the cultural hegemony as 
it finds its funding and organization within the Italian state. For the operationalization of 
this research, Twitter in this analysis can be conceived as a proxy for the wider network 
of social media, as the posts mirror the articles published both on actors’ institutional sites 
and on other their other social media, including Facebook. An inclusion of these other 
sources, as such, would only result in a redundancy in analysis.  
In technical terms, the Twitter accounts analyzed will be @RaiNews for RaiNews, 
@LegaSalvini, @MatteoSalviniMi, and @ilpopulista_it for LN, @GiorgiaMeloni and 
@fratelliditalia for FdI, @casapounditalia, @diStefanoTW, and @ilPrimatoN for CPI. 
This selection covers all institutional actors (state media from the side of RaiNews, 
official party accounts for LN, FdI, and CPI), the candidates for prime minister for each 
party, and the party-affiliated news sites in the case of Il Populista and Il Primato 
Nazionale.  
Then, from these two sources, a Foucauldian discourse analysis will be utilized to display 
how each group constructs narratives of unexpected, politicized events, focusing on how 
these narratives are created and what exactly can be said in each circumstance. As for the 
other qualifiers of the “unexpected” and the “politicized,” “unexpected” in this instance 
would be defined as unforeseen, unanticipated, or incidental occurrences, and in turn, 
“politicized” would be defined as any social, legal, or economic issues from these events 
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that consequentially receive a political charge. As such, the unexpected nature of these 
events therefore would not allow any actors the opportunity to construct a preemptive 
narrative on the issue, which would in turn obfuscate the entire process of contestation 
and consent production, having been preplanned and predisposed already within a 
metanarrative. Twitter also acts as the most suitable digital media platform in this instance 
due to its inherent character of instantaneousness and the factor of character limits for 
each individual tweet. 
From the moment that one of these unexpected event takes places, the coverage of the 
event would then be analyzed chronologically over a period of two weeks, which 
represents the typical information cycle from the breaking post on social media networks 
to publishing in a non-academic journal. In addition, these events will be taken from the 
same historical period of Italian contemporary politics, from December of 2016 to March 
of 2018 (the failure of the Renzi government’s Constitutional Referendum to the 4 March 
national elections, marking one single government cycle). Elections and election results, 
as such, will not be included in these “unexpected” events as the actors can still pre-plan 
a narrative for any of the hypothetical results.  
Below are listed these unexpected, politicized events in sequential and chronological 
order:   
1. Milan Starbucks Protest – 17 February 2017 – 3 March 2017 
2. Rimini Rape – 25 August 2017 – 8 September 2017 – 22 September 2017 
3. FC Lazio Anne Frank Scandal – 23 October 2017 – 4 November 2017 
4. German Imperial Flag Scandal – 7 December 2017 – 21 December 2017 
5. Macerata – 3 February 2018 – 17 February 2018 
In order to analyze the formation of narratives amongst each media source (Italian state 
media and the Italian far right media) will be collected and coded from their Twitter 
platforms and any linked media to these posts after the initial collection of data for every 
event. Each post from all sources would be coded first by relevance to the event in 
question and then in depth by its framing of the event in both positive or negative language 
and its support or opposition of preexisting elements. In order to minimize the subjectivity 
in the placement of narrative framing in the light of positivity or negativity, or support, 
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opposition, or counter narrative strategy, the exact reasoning for such an assignment in 
that vein will be explicitly stated in the analysis. 
Finally, the two sources will be comparatively and chronologically analyzed by their 
presentation for each single event in order to discern any sorts of patterns in narrative 
construction and contestation. The discourse analysis of each would, in turn, discern how 
each of the constructed narratives either supported or opposed those of another subject, 
forming a grand narrative or counter narrative overall across all of the events, if every 
event is taken as its own text. If such a pattern can then be established through data 
collection and analysis, then this research can help to provide a more holistic understand 
of the current state of consent contestation in both local and global contexts. 
The empirical framework of the research, as such, is to show exactly the processes that 
currently allow elite-level consent reproduction to be challenged through differing 
narrative construction, some in opposition, and others in concert. This overall setup will 
answer the research question in that they will directly display how the far right has 
operationalized online media as a platform for its own narratives in reaction to hegemonic 
state media, especially if a pattern of constant opposition is uncovered.  
5. Analysis 
The first event analysis begins in January 2017 while the last occurs in February 2018, 
only two weeks before the 4 March 2018 national elections. With this in mind, each actor 
will be evaluated in its presentation of each event and how each of these narratives and 
discourses evolves over the two week period of analysis. After the analysis of each event 
in completed, then an integrated analysis of the themes, patterns, confluences and 
divergences will be holistically presented. 
5.1 Milan Starbucks Protest – 17 February 2017 – 3 March 2017 
On 16 February 2017, Starbucks planted 42 palm trees in the main square of Milan, and 
protests and attacks against these installations began on 17 March 2017, when an activist 
set fire to one of the palms. Bananas, as well, would come to be planted alongside the 
palms. Resulting from this this event, several far right protests materialized there in 
response to this planting for a variety of reasons. From the internal hegemonic and counter 
hegemonic actors, RaiNews, Matteo Salvini and LN, and CPI would all put forward their 
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own narratives regarding the palms and bananas, expanding it far beyond the confines of 
the piazza.  
RaiNews presented the Starbucks-related occurrences in Milan in a mostly positive light, 
although it mostly ignored any of the far right protests against the planting of the palm 
trees and the vandalism as well. The first tweet that RaiNews put forward about the project 
during this analysis period on 23 February only produced an informative message, stating 
simply that the planting of bananas would follow the already planted palm trees in the 
main square.2 However, this simply informative narrative technique would shift in a 
matter of hours. 
On the same day, the only mention that RaiNews published of opposition to the Starbucks 
palm-planting project came in the construction of the ridiculousness of such antagonism. 
This mention, posted on 23 February 2017, broadcasted the tweet of Roberto Maroni, 
President of Lombardy and member of LN, in response to the installation. The tweet stated 
“now [Italians] only now missing monkeys” with the attached hashtag of “#MyAfrica.”3 
RaiNews described this tweet and the other protests against the palm trees as simply a 
“polemic,” tying such opposition to signify a verbal attack or act of aggression in this 
way.4  
After commenting on the opposition to the project, instead, RaiNews mostly stressed the 
positive economic outcomes of both the installation in terms of jobs created and the need 
for the restyling project itself. In economic terms, RaiNews reported on 28 February 2017 
that the restyling project on the main square would result in 350 jobs created, leaving out 
the fact that these jobs nonetheless would be short-term.5 This report paired with the 
announcement earlier that this “restyling” would continue into 2018, the same period 
                                                     
2 RaiNews. (2017, 23 February). “Dopo le #palme piantati in Piazza Duomo a Milano alcuni banani, a 
completamento del progetto sponsorizzato da multinazionale del caffè.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/834762414138781696.  
3 RaiNews. (2017, 23 February). “Polemiche #Milano su Palme e Banani. @RobertoMaroni_: "Eh sì, 
adesso mancano solo le scimmie #LaMiaAfrica" → http://goo.gl/Xq9lwQ” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/834849269920194560.   
4 Ibid.  
5 RaiNews. (2017, 28 February). “Restyling per la piazza del Duomo a Milano, arriva #Starbucks. Ci sarà 
una torrefazione e 350 posti di lavoro → http://goo.gl/FmQS27” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/836520801864155136.   
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when Starbucks would launch its flagship store in Milan as well.6 As a totality, RaiNews’ 
final points mark a construction of economic optimism for the future of Milan in regards 
to the whole project. 
However, not all shared this same optimism, as pointed out in the first place by RaiNews 
in relation to Roberto Maroni. From the side of the far right, on his Twitter account, 
Salvini only expressed a sarcastic indignation toward the planting of bananas in addition 
to the original planting of palm trees. Salvini’s response was that in response to this 
installation was that he had “no words” to describe his reaction.7 Other than this statement 
– at least on social media – Salvini and LN remained silent.  
Il Populista, the LN-affiliated online newspaper that Salvini co-edits, presented two 
separate tweets relating to the event. The first, from 17 February 2017, relayed Salvini’s 
own message of “camels and monkeys” that the piazza installation was “missing.”8 In 
addition, the linked article from the previous day to this tweet continued in the same 
fashion, marking that “Africa” had come along with Starbucks – a fitting addition to the 
“clandestine” migrants who were already in the piazza.9 This discursive othering and 
framing the physicality of the palms and “clandestine” migrants as equivalent to “camels 
and monkeys” in an “African” totality – linked to Starbucks and the United States – 
implies a necessary characteristic of non-belonging. Lastly, the article itself appealed to 
a nebulous “many” people on Facebook and social media who had voiced opposition and 
discontent with the restyling.10 This hazy type of appeal toward the mass centers Il 
Populista with a general popular will, one that it has already predefined within this 
message.  
                                                     
6 RaiNews. (2017, 28 February). “Milano, restyling per piazza del Duomo: e nel 2018 arriva #starbucks 
→http://goo.gl/pKwkrm” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/836496209896419328.     
7 MatteoSalviniMi. (2017, 23 February)“Dopo le #palme, stanotte in piazza Duomo sono stati piantati i 
#BANANI. Non ho parole.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/834687599725916160.  
8 ilpopulista_it. (2017, 17 February). “Milano, palme e banani in Piazza Duomo. Salvini: "Mancano 
scimmie e cammelli..."” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/832487302991450113.  
9 Il Populista. “Milano, palme e banani in Piazza Duomo. Salvini: "Mancano scimmie e cammelli..."” 16 
February 2017, Retrieved from http://www.ilpopulista.it/news/16-Febbraio-2017/10832/milano-palme-e-
banani-in-piazza-duomo-salvini-mancano-scimmie-e-cammelli.html.  
10 Ibid. 
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On 19 February 2017, Il Populista continued with this appeal to the masses, specifically 
a Milanese one in this case. The tweet framed the restyling as “how to piss off the 
Milanese,” and the article itself presented the Piazza Duomo – where the installation was 
placed – “in the collective unconscious of the Milanese, stands as a tall symbol of revolt 
against invaders.”11 It goes onward to directly state that this square stands for “liberty” 
and that this installation – with all of the connotations given to it by Il Populista and the 
others actors of the right – acts as “violence against liberty.”12 For Il Populista, these 
palms and bananas had come to represent a sort of cultural imperialism against the 
Milanese – foreign bodies of flora and man – that had been planted there without consent.  
As a side note, unlike Salvini, LN, and Il Populista, Meloni and FdI did not comment on 
the issue at all, staying focused on national-wide socially conservative issues and not 
venturing into local politics. 
Of all of the far right actors, CPI produced the most narrative content on the topic of the 
palm trees and bananas. On 18 February 2017, on their Twitter official account, CPI 
presented the changes as an “unacceptable choice, linking it to their Facebook page that 
expounded upon this description.13 In this Facebook post, it continued, presenting the 
move as “against the history and the traditions of the city,” “Africanization,” and a 
strategy of distraction by the city government to distract from social problems and 
unemployment.14   
In its tweet from Il Primato Nazionale on 20 February 2017, CPI linked the palm trees to 
a wider historical background and then lobbied charges of hypocrisy against the “leftist” 
counter protesters.15 As it was explained in the linked article of Il Primato Nazionale, the 
                                                     
11 Ilpopulista_it. (19 February 2017). “Quelle palme in piazza Duomo. Come fare incazzare i milanesi” 
[Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/833257114793553921; Alfredo 
Lissoni, “Quelle palme in piazza Duomo. Come fare incazzare i milanesi” Il Populista, 19 February 2017, 
http://www.ilpopulista.it/news/19-Febbraio-2017/10934/quelle-palme-in-piazza-duomo-come-fare-
incazzare-i-milanesi.html.  
12 Ibid. 
13 CasaPoundItalia. (2017, 18 February). “Milano, CasaPound - Banani e palme in Piazza Duomo, 
CasaPound “scelta inaccettabile, una presa in giro alla... http://fb.me/1PWs0weuS” [Twitter Post]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/CasaPoundItalia/status/833013613279457281.  
14 CasaPound Italia. 18 February 2017. “Milano, CasaPound - Banani e palme in Piazza Duomo, “scelta 
inaccettabile, una presa in giro alla storia e alle tradizioni della città...” [Facebook Post]. Retrieved from 
https://www.facebook.com/casapounditalia/posts/10154500870467842. 
15 IlPrimatoN. (2017, 20 February). “#cronaca: #Starbucks deturpa l'immagine di un simbolo e la sinistra 
insulta chi protesta #palmeMilano #IlPrimatoN” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/IlPrimatoN/status/833648152062337024.   
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palm trees, in the official description by the city government, were an homage to the palm 
trees that were placed in the main square during the 1800s – specifically in a colonial 
context from the conquest of Libya.16 Therefore, in this way, CPI was accusing those 
opposing them of a defense of imperialism and colonialism, a charge normally lobbied 
against the right. Nonetheless, this article also stressed the fact that the restyling project 
was initiated and put underway specifically by an “American multinational” corporation, 
infusing the whole issue with anti-globalization sentiments. 
The narrative distinctions between RaiNews and the far right were in an almost complete 
dichotomy. RaiNews constructed an overwhelming positive view of the entire project in 
principally economic terms – focusing on jobs created – while the far right opposed the 
installation on primarily cultural terms, viewing it as an unwanted transformation and an 
affront to the history and architecture of the city, but nevertheless adding its own 
economic counter narrative. The tension between the narrative of the cultural hegemony 
and the counter hegemony explicitly shows a differentiation of values in this specific 
paradigm. The unrooted nexus of economic development clashed directly with the 
cultural and historic trappings that the actors of the far right – specifically from CPI – 
presented in response.  
5.2 Rimini Rape – 25 August 2017 – 8 September 2017 
On the night of 25 August 2017, a Polish couple was having their vacation on the beach 
in Rimini when they were approached by an individual who asked for their phones and 
wallets. At first, thinking that this was a robbery, the couple tried to flee, but three other 
individuals arrived, and then the man was beaten and the woman there was raped by all 
of the individuals. Afterward, this event was constructed by all internal actors – 
extensively by the far right. 
RaiNews first reported on the rape the day after it happened, 26 August 2017, which was 
the first mention also of the nationality of the victims, who were Polish.17 The next day, 
27 August 2017, was the most active day for RaiNews in regards to the rape, as it tweeted 
                                                     
16 Adriano Scianca. “Le palme a Milano e l’isteria della sinistra tutta impegno e frappuccino” Il Primato 
Nazionale. 20 February 2017. Retrieved from http://www.IlPrimatoN.it/politica/le-palme-a-milano-e-
listeria-della-sinistra-tutta-impegno-e-frappuccino-57892/.  
17 RaiNews. (2017, 26 August). “#rimini : lei violentata da quattro uomini in spiaggia, lui picchiato e 
derubato. Vittima coppia turisti polacchi →http://goo.gl/vRZYHu” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/901423854438035456. 
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five separate times on the matter. The narrative, which still trended toward an informative 
presentation of the events, mentioned the “brutality” of the rape.18 It also presented the 
statement of the victim, bringing in a level of emotionality, who was just asking for help 
to “return home.”19 The rest of the tweets and articles from this day just talked about the 
rape and the police search for the perpetrators.  
30 August 2017 was RaiNews’ next mention of the rape. It focused on the fact that the 
rapists had been identified “beyond a shadow of a doubt” but did not go into depth in any 
sort of construction of who these rapists were beyond the fact that they had been 
identified.20 In the last week of analysis, between 2 September 2017 and 5 September 
2017, RaiNews finally capped off the full picture by presenting the accused rapists 
themselves. However, in its headline, RaiNews presented “two Moroccan minors” who 
had turned themselves into the police in Rimini, but within that headline, the rape itself 
was not mentioned.21 The next article, which mentioned the arrest of the rapists, included 
no mention of ethnicity or nationality.22 The last article posted on the Rimini rape, which 
quoted the leader of the rapists, Butungu, presented the others there during the rape as 
“only boys.”23 
Nonetheless, the last major point of RaiNews’ narrative came on 4 September 2017, 
during which the possibility of extradition of the accused rapists came into question due 
to an outside actor, the Polish government.24 This possibility had not been mentioned as 
                                                     
18 RaiNews. (2017, 27 August). “Il dibattito su #sgomberi e regole e la brutale violenza di #Rimini: le 
prime pagine dei quotidiani in edicola → http://goo.gl/x73Be2” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/901683491372445696.  
19 RaiNews. (2017, 27 August). “#Rimini, la ragazza polacca stuprata di fronte al fidanzato: "Vi prego, 
aiutateci a tornare a casa" → http://goo.gl/s3hXp4” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/901760826285150208.    
20 RaiNews. (2017, 30 August). “Stupro di gruppo a #Rimini, una delle vittime riconosce i quattro 
violentatori "senza ombra di dubbio" →http://goo.gl/xpu84W” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/902927426925289473.    
21 RaiNews. (2017, 2 September). “Stupri di Rimini: due marocchini minorenni si sono presentati ai 
carabinieri di Pesaro che li stanno ascoltando → http://goo.gl/bJkg7U” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/904007466970734593. 
22 RaiNews. (2017, 2 September). Stupri di #Rimini, hanno confessato i due minorenni che si erano 
presentati oggi ai Carabinieri di Pesaro → http://goo.gl/DqMMbX” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/RaiNews/status/904013765108256770.    
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a hypothetical outcome from the situation from RaiNews alone and instead only 
actualized from Poland as an external source.  
In the totality of its narrative, RaiNews produced a primarily informative narrative 
regarding the rape. However, in its discursive linkages, RaiNews separated ethnicity or 
origin from criminals but not from the victims, who it stated from the very beginning 
were Polish nationals. Nonetheless, this did not mean an ignorance of the background of 
the accused rapists – RaiNews included two mentions of the youth of the culprits.    
The actors of the far right, however, did not shy away from presenting the rape in Rimini 
as a part of their metanarrative, linking it to many other issues. Matteo Salvini was the 
single most vocal individual in response to the rape, with nine tweets within the two-week 
period of analysis. The day after the rape, Salvini responded that the perpetrators – whom 
he directly named as “worms” – deserved “chemical castration.”25 Salvini continues in 
this manner, with the implication of physical violence, when he threatens to “kick” the 
cultural mediator who “defended the rape… in the balls.”26 Even after the culprits were 
taken into prison on 2 September 2017, Salvini repeated such rhetoric; “if they are guilty, 
minors or not, it is chemical castration and then to send them home!”27 
Nonetheless, Salvini did not solely utilize this rhetoric of hard, physical justice in 
response to the rape. He also, on several occasions, deliberately brought in other actors 
and operationalized their own narratives for his own uses. The first of such motions came 
with Salvini stating how it was “strange” that all twenty of the suspects for the rape were 
migrants, and that he was still waiting for the “condemnation” of Laura Boldrini in 
response.28 From this mention of Boldrini, Salvini tried to provoke a response from the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies, who, also, generally holds pro-migrant and pro-
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European Union views. In addition, Boldrini was also running for Prime Minister for the 
left-leaning political party, Liberi e Uguali. 
On 30 August 2017, Salvini would go on to even quote Boldrini, repeating what she had 
earlier stated, saying that “migrants offer a way of life that will soon be very dispersed 
among all of us.”29 However, he would addend this statement, adding some commentary 
of his own; “good night to all of you, other than the accomplice.”30 From this addendum, 
Salvini made his narrative completely clear: migrants bring a “way of life” exemplified 
by this rape, and that Boldrini, i.e., by proxy the government in power, was an accomplice 
to this rape. 
In addition, on 3 September 2017, Salvini also posted a collage of pictures of the lead 
rapist, Guerlin Butungo, with pictures taken from his Facebook profile. From Salvini’s 
perspective, this post was intended to raise the question of why, exactly, Butungo was 
receiving a stipend from the state as an asylum-seeker, and why he was an asylum-seeker 
in the first place, as, according to Salvini, his clothes in these pictures were too expensive 
for someone who supposedly was looking for a better life.31 Aside from the rape itself, 
the choice of this post by Salvini also reinforced the far right metanarrative that migrants 
are not coming to Italy for safety but solely for benefits.  
Salvini also employed the use of sarcasm in the creation of a counter-narrative, saying 
that the fact that “two Moroccans” and “two Congolese” committing the rape was 
“strange” since they were “supposed to pay our pensions.”32 This response squares up 
against the ongoing narrative by the PD, as well as some other media sources, that 
migration will economic offset Italian demographic decline. In addition, this plays into 
his overall strategy of bringing Laura Boldrini into the wider conversation.  
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Il Populista followed Salvini’s narrative in a similar fashion, beginning with an 
informative post about the rape on 26 August 2017 but then automatically asserting the 
next day that the rape had been committed by four “Africans,” without a specificity of 
how such information had been obtained, considering such a statement had not been 
released by the police.33 However, on 29 August 2017, these four “Africans” became four 
“Maghrebi” as the narrative evolved and more information came out on the rape.34 
Throughout the entire period of analysis, until 7 September 2017, Il Populista would 
continue to present such informative articles about the developments in the case. 
Il Populista also presented the cultural mediator as a rape apologist, but unlike Salvini, 
there was no threat of violence in this instance. On 28 August 2017, Il Populista reported 
on the comments that the cultural mediator made, stating that “women like rape” and that 
“after the horrible act… women treat it as a normal sexual rapport,” tying it to shocked 
reactions from other media sources and LN politicians.35 The article also continued to 
repeat the name of the cultural mediator and took indignation with the fact that he was 
studying law.36 The message of the article directly secured the entire idea of this sort of 
“cultural mediation” as something tantamount to rape apologism.  
However, this volley against the cultural mediator was not the sole instance of linking 
this rape to failures of the government and the political left. On 1 September 2017, Il 
Populista forward the comments of Salvini, stating sarcastically “how beautiful is the 
Italy that Renzi is leaving with us” in regards to the rape, presenting this instance as a 
representative of the entire state of Italy under the Renzi and the PD government.37 On 6 
September 2017, this perception of failure continues in the presentation of a past 
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government policy to send money to Moroccans to return to their country of origin as a 
failed bribe illustrative of a failed government.38 The clear implication of such a statement 
is that a new, differently oriented government should take its place - LN.  
In addition, again in the same way as Salvini, Il Populista mentioned physical 
punishments – chemical castration and deportation – as the suitable punishment for the 
rapists, but it nonetheless framed the argument in a completely different fashion. While 
Salvini directly stated it as the just punishment, Il Populist brought its readership into the 
discourse by posing it as a question – “Rimini rape: chemical castration deportation. Do 
you agree?”39 Nonetheless, this occurred on 9 September 2017, almost two weeks after 
Salvini first even fielded the possibility, and as such was framed as in such a way that if 
this did not occur (and per Italian law, this would not occur), then any punishment – save 
deportation to Poland for trial – would be unjust.  
While not mentioning the rape the same amount, Giorgia Meloni paralleled Salvini’s and 
Il Populista’s discursive strategies in many ways, but she nonetheless added her own 
personal spin to the events. Two days after it took place, Meloni first mentioned the rape, 
linking it to “Italy being reduced to a South American favela,” including civilizational 
discourse on the matter.40 Meloni also commented on the comments of the cultural 
mediator, although not completely in the same way that Salvini did. While Salvini 
appealed the direct violence of a “kick… in the balls,” Meloni said that the cultural 
mediator deserved to be “indicted and put in prison for the incitement of crime,” a state-
sanctioned, law and order approach.41  
Meloni, also like Salvini, also appealed directly to Laura Boldrini on 29 August 2017. 
However, unlike Salvini, Meloni directly messaged this point to her – from the 
perspective of a “woman, mother, and citizen” if Boldrini had nothing to say about the 
                                                     
38 ilpopulista_it. (2017 6 September). “DOPO IL BRANCO DI RIMINI Paolini: “Lo Stato aveva offerto 
20mila euro ai marocchini per tornare in Patria nel...”[Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/905362496369950720.  
39 ilpopulista_it. (2017, 9 September). “Stupro di Rimini: castrazione chimica rimpatrio. Sei d'accordo?” 
[Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/904250180526108672.  
40 GiorgiaMeloni. (2017, 27 August). “Donna stuprata e marito pestato a #Rimini: l'Italia ridotta a favela 
sudamericana. Ora massima mobilitazione per stanare i colpevoli ST” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/901725096733270017.  
41 GiorgiaMeloni. (2017, 28 August). “Allucinante il commento del #mediatore culturale sullo #stupro di 
#Rimini: va indagato e messo in galera per istigazione a delinquere ST” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/902198897543696390.  
33 
 
rapes committed by the “Maghrebi worms” (again, mirroring Salvini’s use of animalizing 
language).42 Meloni again brought up the “worms,” linking it to the migration policy. 
These rapist “worms,” now “rotting in jail” were receiving the asylum stipend of 37 euros 
a day – markedly that “we” – being the Italian people – “maintain.”43 Finally, on 6 
September 2017, Meloni spoke about the issue one last time during the analysis period, 
again linking the Rimini rape to the wider migration policies of Italy. For Meloni, the 
“violence” in Rimini was the “collateral damage of uncontrolled immigration,” the logical 
consequence of the direction take by the state.44  
Both Salvini, Il Populista, and Meloni brought Poland into the discourse as well – Salvini 
on 4 September 2017 and Meloni on 5 September 2017. While Meloni’s response to the 
extradition response was in the positive, simply stating that it needed to be done “right 
away,” Salvini extrapolated this by saying that although “a bit of jail time will do them 
good, what justice is it?”45 Poland’s migration policy – and its rejection of EU migration 
quotas – is not something lost to Salvini and Meloni. By so emphatically agreeing with 
the Polish requests, Salvini and Meloni made it implicitly clear that Poland provides 
justice, and in order for Italy to do the same, it should follow the Polish example.  
Il Populista also made direct references to statements from members of the Polish 
government in marking that the Polish direction of justice toward the rapists would be 
more fitting a punishment than what they would receive in Italy. On 29 August 2017, the 
paper published the statements of the Polish vice Minister for Justice, Patryk Jasik, noted 
that the “death penalty” for them would be the fitting outcome as well as that “these are 
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your migrants – do you want them here in Poland?”46  The subtext of such was that these 
migrants – already linked to rape – would not be wanted in Italy either.  
Of the far right actors, CPI, along with its online newspaper Il Primato Nazionale, 
produced the brunt of narrative and discursive ammunition in response to the rape. The 
day after the rape itself, Il Primato Nazionale marked that “four North Africans” 
committed the rape, bringing in the issue of race and ethnicity before any other actor.47 
In addition, Il Primato Nazionale refocused this event in reference to previous sexual 
violence committed by migrants, entitling this “Maghrebis with precedents,” 
strengthening this racializing narrative.48 The newspaper also provided a mixture of 
presentation by linking all together the “minor” “Moroccans” with the “rape” itself, 
reaffixing the constitutive narrative parts that RaiNews would later present in separate 
portions regarding the rape.49 At the end of the period, Il Primato Nazionale delivered its 
final metanarrative point, which was that “the Rimini rape shows that integration does 
not exist,” with its “refugees” and “new Italians.”50 
In addition, CPI tweeted that the major newspaper Repubblica was indignant that the 
accused rapists were being insulted.51 Through this, CPI linked what it views as 
mainstream media as being a defender of rape through its defense of migrants. Il Primato 
Nazionale acted similarly, saying that the “cultural mediator” in response to the rape was 
“pro-rape.”52 This follows Salvini’s and Meloni’s same logic as well from two days 
earlier.  
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CPI, in this way, was the only actual political party to comment on the rapes. Markedly, 
neither of the party platforms of the major right wing actors – neither LN nor FdI – 
presented any narrative regarding the rape. The narratives came solely and completely 
from the individuals representing the parties, Salvini and Meloni. Inversely, di Stefano 
did not offer any comment on the events.  
Overall, the narrative battle over the Rimini rape displayed a dichotomy of narrative 
presentation between the cultural hegemony and the counter hegemony of the far right. 
RaiNews primarily informed about the events following the rape, and only at the very end 
did any sort of racialization come into its narrative. Salvini and Meloni, being completely 
representative of LN and FdI in this case, only provided an informative narrative at the 
onset of the events – stating that this rape had occurred – before moving forward with 
suggesting calls to action, responses, and discursive linkages with meta-issues, 
specifically Italian migration policy. CPI, even in its preliminary present of the narrative 
immediately racialized the issue, presenting it as a rape committed by North Africans, 
and then moved forward with incorporating this occurrence with its metanarrative of 
immigration and migration policy as a whole.  
In this case, CPI was the very first to present the narrative that would become dominant 
for the entirety of the far right, and would in fact even cursorily seep into that of RaiNews, 
if solely through the mention of ethnic background. The main difference between the 
counter hegemonic narrative and the culturally hegemonic one is that the culturally 
hegemonic narrative did not provide any issue-linkages.  
5.3 FC Lazio Anne Frank Scandal – 23 October 2017 – 4 November 2017 
On 23 October 2017, stickers depicting Anne Frank in the football jersey of Roma FC 
were discovered plastered outside of Rome’s Olympia Stadium alongside anti-Semitic 
graffiti directed toward Roma FC fans. It was later discovered that the stickers were 
created by the ultras of Lazio FC, known for their right wing fanaticism. The event 
snowballed into a plethora of statements – from the government, the media, and the 
football clubs themselves – denouncing the stickers and the groups behind them, pledging 
to remedy the situation. RaiNews and CPI issued the all of the narrative framing regarding 
this event, going directly against each other at times. The actors of LN and FdI remained 
completely silent on the issue. 
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Of all the actors, RaiNews presented the widest berth of overall information and narrative 
in regards to the scandal. In the first three days after the initial story became known by 
the media at large, starting on 23 October 2017 onward, RaiNews tweeted nine separate 
times. The first of these messages first provided the basic information about the discovery 
of the “gift” of the Lazio ultras, which showed Anne Frank in a t-shirt of the Roma team 
with the implication that these fans would meet the same fate – the entirety of which 
RaiNews described as “shock.”53 The next tweet on 23 October 2017 would go on to 
describe “anti-Semitic graffiti” written nearby where the stickers had been found, which 
would be characterized as being of “low character” by the Lazio team establishment.54  
24 October 2017 marked the largest amount of discursive construction from the side of 
RaiNews. From the beginning of the day, RaiNews informed on the how the President of 
the Lazio team would confirm a visit to a synagogue for all the players, along with a quote 
from Renzi that “the teams [should be] on the field with the Star of David,” rebroadcasting 
the governmental view on the matter.55 RaiNews continued by reporting on how the Lazio 
team establishment would now send two hundred fans a year to Auschwitz as an “official 
initiative” in order to “not forget.”56  
Nonetheless, these statements did not cause the indignity surrounding the event to 
subside. On 24 October 2017, during the minute of silence for Anne Frank, which was 
ordered to take place during the upcoming football matches, ultras “shouted anti-Semitic” 
cheers, on which RaiNews again described.57 RaiNews reported on this story again on 25 
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October 2017, adding the comments of the mayor of Ascoli, who characterized these 
cheers as “the gravest damage to the image of the city.”58 
The last piece of RaiNews’ narrative on the scandal, from 25 October 2017, conveyed that 
sixteen of the fans involved with the production of the stickers had been identified, and 
that the Lazio ultras renounced going to the upcoming game in Bologna where readings 
from Anne Frank’s diary would take place before the game. 59 This tweet also stressed – 
by way of outward implication – that the polemic surrounding the issue “would not stop,” 
although the polemic had mainly been reproduced by RaiNews in the first place.60 
Nonetheless, for the rest of the two-week period of analysis, RaiNews did not mention the 
scandal any more.  
RaiNews’ narrative was incredibly clear and focused: neither racism nor anti-Semitism 
will be accepted in Italy, and any act of either will be widely covered, denounced, and 
disciplined, as seen through the automatic reaction by the football league and the Lazio 
administration. Both racism and anti-Semitism are considered damaging and even its very 
existence would be considered a shock. For those first three days after the sticker first 
was found, this event dominated RaiNews’ overall coverage, completely overshadowing 
any other events. This narrative dominance amongst all the issues reported between 23 
and 25 October 2017 is especially striking considering the fact that the Catalonian 
independence referendum had occurred in the same period. Nonetheless and by far, 
RaiNews focused on this event more than all of the other actors combined. 
Moving away from RaiNews and the culturally hegemonic discourses, neither Meloni nor 
Salvini – nor their respective parties – addressed the scandal in any way, even by 
recognition that it occurred. This absence served to distance both parties from any 
accusations of racism or anti-Semitism, which could poison the electoral success of any 
far right or right-leaning party. As there was no apparent reason for either party to get 
involved, as neither were named or linked to the event, their distance allowed them to 
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keep their metaphorical hands clean. This being said, the far right as a totality was not 
completely silent in the face of this scandal.  
All the same, CPI did not shy from this controversy and produced three tweets regarding 
the stickers and anti-Semitism, and unlike LN and FdI, it did not only avoid the narrative 
produced by the cultural hegemony but instead went against it directly. On 25 October 
2017, two days after the stickers had been found, Il Primato Nazionale published a story 
about the expected “theater” surrounding the issue of Anne Frank.61 For CPI, the fact that 
there was such indignation about the holocaust and Anne Frank and not about the deaths 
of Italians in the foibe showed that, for them, such manufactured outrage only served 
political ends.62 After the ultras cheered during the moment of silence for Anne Frank, Il 
Primato Nazionale continued with this narrative, stating that the strategy of boosting this 
event to such a highly visible level had acted as a “boomerang” in that it showed that not 
everyone shared the same universal indignation.63 
Through Il Primato Nazionale, CPI was also able to integrate the foibe narrative into the 
entirety of the scandal. The online paper tweeted about the “ignoble jeers” that “do not 
make the news,” bringing to light the celebration of some Italian leftist groups of the 
“foibe,” or the ethnic cleansing of Italians from Yugoslavian Istria after the Second World 
War.64 For CPI, this boosted coverage of the Anne Frank stickers and the relative silence 
of culturally hegemonic media regarding another institutionalized mass killing was an 
equivalence to an “apology” for the matter.65 
As an extreme right party, CPI operates more ideologically rather than taking electoral 
success into its calculus, which helps in the explanation of its choice to comment on the 
matter in the first place. As such, this allowed CPI much greater freedom in their content 
production than either LN or FdI would be allowed for themselves. In addition, their 
supporters are also mainly ideological in their own personal calculi, and in this way, any 
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sort of accusations of anti-Semitism or racism would not affected them in the same way 
it would for members of LN or FdI. 
As per the overall narrative regarding the scandal, RaiNews presented the creation of these 
stickers as a societal transgression and did not allow for any sort of alternative viewpoint 
– such as that of CPI – to be allowed any space for reproduction. While CPI did not go 
into a vein of holocaust denialism or any sort of explicitly racial counter narratives, it did 
provide its own tangent that focused primarily on the instrumentalization of the holocaust 
for political purposes in addition to the foibe’s insignificance for what it views as 
mainstream, hegemonic media. Nonetheless, this far right narrative remained localized 
solely within the extreme right, and it did not find any reproduction outside of that 
discursive sphere.  
5.4 German Imperial Flag Scandal – 2 December 2017 – 16 December 2017 
On 2 December 2017, a video surfaced on the internet that showed the inside of a police 
barracks in Florence when filmed from the outside through a window. Hanging on the 
wall in the middle of the room was a large red, black, and white flag with the iron cross, 
which had been used by the Imperial German navy but also more recently by neo-Nazi 
groups. From this initial posting of the video, it spread throughout social media and digital 
sources, eventually coming to influence the narratives of RaiNews, Il Populista, and CPI. 
RaiNews first presented the event on the same day of 2 December 2017 as breaking new, 
presenting the flag in the room as “neo-Nazi” in character.66 An hour and a half later, 
conversely, RaiNews restructured this initial narrative, describing this flag as “a German 
war flag used by Nazis against the Weimar Republic,” still stressing the Nazi ties of the 
flag but nonetheless allowing for some discursive distance between the “Nazi” 
connotations and the flag itself.67 However, on 3 December 2017, RaiNews shifts back to 
its initial description as the flag as “neo-Nazi” once again when labeling the flag in 
relation to an investigation conducted by the military prosecutor on the matter, which in 
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turn cemented its presentation of the neo-Nazi flag to be a symbol directly tied to Matteo 
Salvini with “an assault rifle in his hand.”68  
During the two-week period of analysis, not a single actor from either of the major far 
right parties – LN and FdI – even touches upon the issue. This silence is especially 
puzzling since a poster of Matteo Salvini was situated next to the German Imperial flag, 
which could, in theory, elicit some sort of response from Salvini himself.69 In addition, in 
comparison with other issues, Salvini and Meloni are quite present in making their 
opinions and personal understandings of political narratives known, so their silence in 
response to this event amounts to a conscious choice to distance themselves from the flag, 
especially in the case of Salvini.  
However, Il Populista does publish two articles on the events, the first of which from 4 
December 2017 presenting the hegemonic narrative of the neo-Nazi flag to be “FAKE 
NEWS.”70 In addition, this “FAKE NEWS” is presented as either ignorance of the “left 
and the grillini” (supporters of Movimento 5 Stelle) if not outright “deception,” implying 
that such a connotation or connection between Salvini and the flag was strategy to smear 
the party leader’s reputation.71 The article goes on to stress the Prussian origins of the flag 
and situate it in an anti-Nazi paradigm, as some former Prussian military officers had 
mutinied against Hitler. Il Populista also forwarded another article on the same day, 
stressing that such symbols that existed on the Imperial German flag predated Third Reich 
and the German Empire – going all the way back to Charlemagne and the Holy Roman 
Empire – so as such they constitute European heritage and only  an act of “hypocrisy” 
would conflate them with Nazi ideology.72  
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In a similar fashion, the actors of CPI did not remain silent in the face of this news and 
presented a counter narrative of the event in response, and the brunt of this response came 
from Il Primato Nazionale. Two hours after the post of RaiNews and a day before the post 
of Il Populista on 3 December 2017, Il Primato Nazionale presents the creation of 
“#fakenews” in relation to the flag, focusing on the fact that the flag was, as a symbol, 
originally the ensign of the German Imperial Navy.73 Il Primato Nazionale continues in 
this vein the next day, 4 December 2017, expounding upon the “#fakenews” aspect of the 
larger narrative of the Nazi-connected flag. In fact, Il Primato Nazionale presents the 
German Imperial flag not as a Nazi flag, but invert the situation completely, stating that 
such a flag represents the Prussian tradition within the German military, specifically the 
“Prussian hero” of Count Klaus von Stauffenberg who tried to assassinate Adolf Hitler in 
Operation Valkyrie – in the way that Il Populista would also present the flag later.74 To 
the thesis of RaiNews and the culturally hegemonic narrative, CPI provided a complete 
antithesis.  
However, when looking outside of the narrative of only Il Primato Nazionale for CPI, 
Simone di Stefano pushed forward the narrative presentation of the flag in a completely 
divergent direction. He tweeted, that “if it is the flag of the Kaiser is not good (and it is 
not good) because we fought against them, then neither is the flag of the United States or 
the United Kingdom.”75 This discursive linkage makes both the German Empire and the 
United States and Great Britain all imperial equivalents, which to di Stefano signifies a 
logical opposition. 
As per the overall narrative construction of the flag scandal, RaiNews and CPI show the 
complete struggle for the framing of the event. Nevertheless, the two poles of RaiNews 
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and CPI created competing alternating narratives. Instead of any of the narrative elements 
of the cultural hegemony of RaiNews affecting the counter hegemonic element of CPI, 
CPI took a narrative piece of RaiNews’ general story – that the flag was used by the 
Imperial German navy – and completely inverted it to act as an absolute opposition to 
what RaiNews had originally constructed. For CPI, this flag was forwarded not as a neo-
Nazi flag but instead as an anti-Nazi flag as per the von Stauffenberg aside. 
5.5 Macerata - 3 February 2018 – 17 February 2018  
On the morning of 3 February 2018, outside of the Macerata train station, Luca Traini 
drove by and opened fire targeted at suspected migrants of African origin. In total, he shot 
five individuals, sending them all to the hospital. After his shooting spree, Traini then 
parked his car in front of Macerata’s war memorial, and when the police finally arrested 
him there, Traini gave a Roman salute while he had the Italian flag draped around his 
shoulders. Later it would be uncovered that Traini had previously run for a local 
governmental seat as a member of LN. This event would be covered by all actors, who 
would all represent the plurality of narratives resulting for this event, which had the 
largest narrative impact of all the analyzed events.  
RaiNews, representing the cultural hegemony, provided the largest trove of both 
information and narrative from any single source, with 37 tweets regarding Macerata 
during the two-week period of analysis. On the day of the shootings, 3 February 2018, 
RaiNews tweeted seven separate times, beginning with three informative posts while the 
situation was still in development and then evolving into a presentation of a “racist raid” 
by an individual “clad in the tricolor” and giving “a Roman salute.”76 On 4 February 2018, 
RaiNews continued in this same fashion, presenting Traini (now known as the shooter) as 
a neo-fascist with a copy of Mein Kampf, a black flag with a white Celtic cross, and other 
items “associated with the extreme right.”77 Such a statement had discursively linked the 
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murders with any far right actors. The rests of the tweets from 4 February 2018 continued 
this message, stressing the racist nature of the attack. On 5 February 2018, RaiNews even 
reported on Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan’s response to the attack, who was 
visiting Rome at the time. He characterized the Macerata attacks as a “racist attack,” 
which deserved a “decisive response.”78 
On 5 February 2018 as well, RaiNews first linked the shootings to the murder of Pamela 
Mastropietro, with Traini’s shooting representing an act of vengeance.79 In addition, 
RaiNews stopped its presentation of the attacks as a racist incident. However, on 6 
February 2018, RaiNews began to shift its focus of Macerata to have Mastropietro exist 
as a separate narrative, focusing on events solely linked to this murder.80 In addition, 
RaiNews also reported on demonstrations both by the “extreme right,” “anti-racists,” and 
“anti-fascists” (described by RaiNews as “peaceful”) in Macerata in relation to the 
shootings.81 Nonetheless, 12 February 2018 was the last mention of Macerata in any form, 
and in this sense, it focused primarily on the murder of Mastropietro. The four tweets of 
RaiNews focused on the imprisonment of a fourth suspect in her murder, while also 
mentioning a statement of her uncle urging the authorities to “stay civil.”82  
Regarding the Macerata shootings, FdI’s Giorgia Meloni only directly mentioned the 
shootings by Traini only once. Not giving an immediate response to the event, Meloni 
tweeted, “he who shoots at innocents is not my Italy” two days after the shootings took 
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place.83 Her next and final tweet regarding the events took a conspiratorial tone, alleging 
that the Ministry of Internal Affairs could have stopped the shootings but decided not to 
do so because the electoral campaign had begun, hinting that such optics of the right 
would harm them in the election.84 However, Meloni did not ignore the totality of dealings 
in Macerata completely, and in the stead of focusing on the shootings, she decidedly took 
her narrative in an inverse direction.  
In its place, Meloni’s Macerata was not one focused on Traini yet instead one focused on 
Pamela Mastropietro, a woman who had been murdered in Macerata several by migrants 
weeks earlier, allegedly one of the triggers for Traini’s shooting spree. On 7 February 
2018, Meloni tweeted about the “bastard drug-dealing Nigerian” who killed Mastropietro, 
remarking that he had been involved in other crimes and not caught, implying again the 
ineptness or nefariousness of the ruling government.85 Meloni’s remaining four tweets 
regarding Macerata all focused on Mastropietro and the Nigerians, only referring to the 
shootings once again by remarking that the government was privileging the victims of the 
shooting to distract from the previous murder.86 
The party account of FdI acted more proactively in presenting their narrative of events 
that more or less mirrored that of Meloni. On 4 February 2018, FdI stated that the 
President and the government were “making excuses” for the shootings.87 Afterward, the 
FdI account extrapolated on this claim, stating that the PD had created an environment of 
“fear and mistrust toward irregular migrants,” blaming the ruling government for the 
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shooting instead, an inversion of the RaiNews strategy.88 Then, starting on 7 February and 
continuing through 14 February 2018, FdI sustained a refocusing of Macerata on Pamela 
Mastropietro, tweeting on the subject 16 separate times.  
Compared to Meloni and FdI, Matteo Salvini forwarded a much more bombastic narrative 
regarding the shootings in Macerata but nonetheless followed the same general pattern. 
On the day of the shooting, Salvini tweeted that violence “is always condemned” but 
nonetheless goes on to blame “open immigration” for bringing “chaos, anger, and social 
clash” without directly mentioning any of the specifics of the shooting.89 The next day, 
Salvini goes on to advocate for the deportation of migrants in order to safeguard against 
future attacks like that of Macerata.90 Such a statement nonetheless implicitly shields 
Traini from culpability for the shooting, as it implies that it would not have occurred if 
the migrants had not been in Macerata in the first place. Nonetheless, Salvini acted much 
more proactively than Meloni regarding in his framing of the event.  
However, on 10 February 2018, Salvini reproduced the same narrative of Meloni about 
Pamela Mastropietro, decidedly striving to shift the focus of the Macerata association 
from Traini to that of Pamela, claiming that the left in their demonstrations were ignoring 
the migrant crimes that led to this death.91 He goes on to condemn the protests of the left 
in Macerata, saying that “as an Italian,” he was ashamed by the rallies – leading with the 
statement that he would bring back “normalcy” to Italy.92 Salvini’s Twitter narrative on 
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Macerata during the two-week analysis ends by tying his speech acts all together by 
coming back to Pamela, saying that no matter if a criminal is “white or black,” that they 
would pay for their crimes nonetheless.93  
The LN account mirrored Salvini almost perfectly. The first mention of the Macerata 
shootings was on 3 February 2018, and the account tweeted that “now is the time for 
justice, swift and without softness.”94 As with most of its posts, the LN account also 
provided a link to its full statement on Facebook. The next day, the account boosted 
Salvini’s message yet again, providing a statement from him that specified that “the 
invasion of migrants leads to social clash.”95 However, after these initial declarations the 
days directly following the shootings, the LN started to realign the narrative of Macerata 
with the murder of Mastropietro, first focusing on her mother and then, for the rest of the 
analysis period, continued to stress the event for another 22 tweets, all repeating the same 
narrative points of Pamela and her murder.96 One of these tweets referenced to possible 
“cannibalism” by the Nigerian mafia that occurred after the murder.97 The only other 
references to Macerata during this time were references to violence resulting from leftist 
demonstrations there in response to the shooting but nothing else on neither Traini nor 
the shooting itself.98  
While some of these posts were republished on the LN official account, Il Populista 
circulated an unprecedented amount of Tweets regarding Macerata – 33 in total, every 
single day between 4 February and 14 February. However, only two of these tweets even 
mentioned the shooting itself, and the rest of them focused solely on the affairs 
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"Cannibalismo rituale della mafia nigeriana" [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/962960769846476800.  
98 legasalvini. (2018, 10 February). “"Da italiano mi vergogno per la manifestazione di Macerata"” 
[Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/962426007948087301.  
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surrounding the Mastropietro murder.  The only reason that Il Populista even mentioned 
the shootings came from a defense of Salvini in response to political accusations that 
blamed Salvini’s rhetoric for creating an environment in which such violence could occur. 
The response from Il Populista on 12 February 2017? Everything seems to be “Salvini’s 
fault” – and this seemed to be the government’s response to any unfortunate occurrence.99  
The tweets in relation to the Pamela Mastropietro murder from the side of Il Populista 
focused deeply on the origins of the murderers and narratively linking this to “African” 
practices of cannibalism and “ju-ju.” On 4 February 2018, the day after the shootings, Il 
Populista had already published a tweet and linked article on the topic of a “journey into 
the world of African animism,” and on 10 February 2018, this line of discussion continues 
by asking “was it African magic?”100 One of these tweets, from 11 February 2018, 
rhetorically involves the readership in this discourse by posing it as a question – 
“Pamela’s murder, do you see it as a tribal rite?”101 This question has already primed the 
reader to frame the incident in the light of this African ritual, making the crime explicitly 
non-Italian, and framing the murder as being something completely outside of the realm 
of possibility for Italians to commit because its explicit linkages to the migrant other. 
With the other tweets and articles proceeding this one, it is already expected that the 
reader sees it as a foreign, tribal ritual. This narrative of the incompatible African other 
was reproduced one more time on 14 February 2018, during which Il Populista reported 
that in Nigeria, women and children were regularly “cut to pieces,” presenting this as a 
normalized occurrence there.102 The implication to the article was linked to the physical 
presence of people from such cultures would be that such normalized practices would 
follow them. 
                                                     
99 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 12 February) “"MACERATA? COLPA DI SALVINI" Le 'associazioni cattoliche' 
chiedono l'approvazione dello Ius soli, la...” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/963123088257896448.  
100 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 4 February). “VIAGGIO NEL MONDO DELL'ANIMISMO AFRICANO Vudù, 
umbanda, candomblé, santeria, Palo mayombe sono sono alcuni dei...” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/960103214602489856; ilpopulista_it. (2018, 4 February). 
“C'ENTRA LA MAGIA TRIBALE AFRICANA? E intanto sale a tre il numero degli indagati per la 
morte della giovane. E...” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/962363108424585216.  
101 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 11 February). “Omicidio di Pamela, per te c'entra il rito tribale?” [Twitter Post]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/962604717259059200.  
102 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 14 February). “IN NIGERIA "BAMBINI E DONNE" FATTI A PEZZI Il legale 
di uno degli indagati: "Forse un rito dietro la mattanza"....” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/963722060735315969 
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In keeping with this explicitly anti-immigrant message stressing the African origins of 
Mastropietro’s murderers, Il Populista published an article on 13 February 2018 in 
response to Pope – calling him Bergoglio instead of Pope Francis – that reframed his 
argument that “migrants only commit 40 percent of rapes” by refactoring it into a question 
of what percent migrants actually are within Italian society, and that this would actually 
point to them being over-represented in such statistics.103 The linked article also has in its 
headline a picture of Pope Francis with a group of Africans. In addition, by calling him 
Bergoglio instead of using his pontifical title, Il Populista distances him from being able 
to legitimately represent the “evil … Catholics,” who in turn make up over 70 percent of 
Italy’s population and by proxy, Il Populista’s readers. 104 While the Catholic Church 
itself stays away from any scrutiny by Il Populista, any elements of the Church, i.e., the 
Pope, who convey messages contrary to that of Il Populista receives a direct response in 
the direction of negation.  
The other tweets and articles from Il Populista mirrored the general trends from LN, 
Salvini, Meloni, and FdI. The narrative tendencies drifted from blaming the government 
for inaction against criminals due to their migrant background as of its tweets and articles 
from 6, 7, and 8 February 2018 to a generalized reporting of the unfolding events around 
the murder itself, nonetheless, not giving any narrative space to the Traini shootings.105 
The only instance of giving some sort of parallel recognition of the events came through 
an article on the comments of Mastropietro’s mother, who – while condemning the 
shooting spree and denouncing any sort of violence – still noted that “as an Italian, we 
                                                     
103 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 13 February). “PER BERGOGLIO I "CATTIVI" SONO I CATTOLICI Il 
Pontefice: "Immigrati solo il 40% degli stupratori". Già, però sono...” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/963339531612246017; Il Populista, “Il Papa sui criminali 
stranieri: "Sporcati dai commenti, la realtà viene travisata,"” 13 February 2018, 
http://www.ilpopulista.it/news/12-Febbraio-2018/23352/il-papa-sui-criminali-stranieri-sporcati-dai-
commenti-la-realta-viene-travisata.html.   
104 Ibid. 
105 ilpopulista_it. (2018, 6 February). “CIÒ CHE LA STAMPA DEM NON VUOLE DIRE Renzi: "Il 
caso Macerata porta voti alla Lega". E la stampa di Sinistra.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/960873282277867527; ilpopulista_it. (2018, 7 February). “LE 
CARTE SEGRETE DEI PM SU INNOCENT I due nigeriani hanno mutilato la 18enne in più punti, 
l'hanno dissanguata e...” [Twitter Post] Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/961170237461876736; ilpopulista_it. (2018, 8 February). “QUEL 
PD FUORI DAL TEMPO C’è uno strano fenomeno per cui ripetendo più volte una parola questa perde 
di” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/961522560570675200.  
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are tired.”106 Coming from 5 February 2018, this nationalized familial connect predates 
that of RaiNews with Mastropietro’s uncle.  
Compared to the mainstream far right – the actors from LN or FdI – CPI acted the most 
quickly to construct a hermetic narrative regarding the events in Macerata, focusing 
primarily on shifting the focus of Macerata from Traini to Pamela. On 4 February 2018, 
the day after the shooting, Il Primato Nazionale, the newspaper of CPI, already had 
discursively linked the shootings by Traini with the death of Mastropietro, stating that the 
“ministry of truth” had decided that the life of Mastropietro “counted less” than those 
wounded by Traini, being the first of the far right actors to make this claim.107 Simone di 
Stefano, on the same day, called the journalists who asked him not to correlate the two 
events “pathetic” since Mastropietro was “butchered” by Nigerians and Traini “fired on” 
Nigerians.108 Interestingly enough, this was di Stefano’s only personal direct reference to 
Macerata in this two-week period, with CPI as a party and Il Primato Nazionale 
continuing the narrative by repeating di Stefano in other media. Nonetheless, CPI did not 
excuse the “gesture of a deranged man,” in reference to Traini’s shooting spree.109 
However, Il Primato Nazionale even so tried to humanize Traini through presenting the 
“solitude of a vigilante” as being the trigger motivating the attacks.110 The rest of the 
tweets and stories published before 17 February 2018 stressed Mastropietro’s murder and 
violence resulting from leftist demonstrations in response to the shootings, much in the 
same vein as LN.111 However, Il Primato Nazionale was able to infuse an explicitly racial 
tinge to their narrative at the end of the analysis period, publishing a story about a 
                                                     
106  ilpopulista_it. (2018, 5 February). “++ IL PIÙ LETTO DI IERI ++ La mamma di Pamela: "No alla 
violenza, ma da italiana capisco... siamo stanchi!"” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/ilpopulista_it/status/960786459153321984.   
107 IlPrimatoN. (2018, 4 February). “#Macerata, il ministero della Verità ha deciso: #PamelaMastropietro 
conta meno degli spari di #Traini” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/IlPrimatoN/status/960079873174851589.  
108 diStefanoTW. (2018, 8 February). “Una ragazzina squartata da un Nigeriano, fatta a pezzi, eviscerata 
come un pesce e buttata in un fosso a Macerata e un pazzo che a Macerata si mette a sparare sui 
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Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/diStefanoTW/status/960069676473769984.  
109 CasaPoundItalia. (2018, 3 February). “"Il gesto dello squilibrato che a Macerata ha aperto il fuoco 
sugli stranieri va condannato senza esitazioni, si tratta di un atto criminale per cui non ci sono 
giustificazioni". La nota di Gianluca Iannone, presidente di CasaPound.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/CasaPoundItalia/status/959843034404933632. 
110 IlPrimatoN. (2018, 5 February). “#Macerata e il fallimento della politica. La solitudine del giustiziere” 
[Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/IlPrimatoN/status/960440727938494464.  
111 CasaPoundItalia. (2018, 11 February). “Simone Di Stefano sui fatti di Macerata e i cori choc sulle 
foibe.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/CasaPoundItalia/status/962712415023575040.  
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Nigerian cardinal stating that people should “get used to black Italians” in response to 
Macerata.112 
The most engaged actor as a whole was CPI, which commented on the shootings and the 
murder the most consistently throughout the whole period while at the same time tying it 
to wider issues important to the party. CPI was also the first actor to bring in the murder 
of Mastropietro in relation to the shooting. After the shooting occurred on 3 February 
2018, FdI began to reproduce this narrative tying it to Mastropietro on 4 February 2018 
with it later being picked up by LN on 5 February 2018. However, between the 
mainstream far right parties of LN and FdI, Salvini was the first to comment on the 
shootings and to discursively link it to the issue of migration. LN and CPI both explicitly 
racialized the narrative and went in direct confrontation with the institutional Catholic 
Church. Nonetheless, the overall narrative of the far right on the totality of their social 
media regarding the events in Macerata followed a general pattern of identifying the 
shooting, condemning it, and then either diverting attention away from the attacks by 
focusing on the Mastropietro murder and the fact that Nigerian migrants had committed 
this murder. 
As such, the narrative battle between RaiNews and the far right displays an interesting 
paradigm, one that somewhat paralleled that of the Rimini rape. RaiNews first presented 
an opening volley of discursively linking the shootings to the far right, but after this 
subsided, it refocused on the death of Pamela Mastropietro. In opposition, the far right 
denounced the shootings from the first moment, but then directly shifted the emphasis of 
the Macerata brand to both Mastropietro’s murder and violence resulting from leftist 
demonstrations. The directionality for this even came first from the extreme right of CPI 
by claiming that Pamela’s life counted less for the government on 4 February 2018, and 
then such a narrative spread to the rest of the far right by 5 February 2018. This narrative 
actually then became reproduced tentatively by RaiNews on 5 February 2018 as well by 
mentioning it in connection to Traini but then evolved to stand on its own by 6 February 
2018. The events in Macerata show an interplay between what should represent the 
                                                     
112 IlPrimatoN. (2018, 16 February). “Il cardinale #nigeriano sui fatti di #Macerata: “Abituatevi agli 
italiani neri”” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/IlPrimatoN/status/964511423484317696.   
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cultural hegemony picking up and reproducing what was originally the narrative of the 
counter hegemony of the extreme right that it condemned on the onset. 
5.6 An Integrated Narrative Analysis  
From the representative totality of these five events and the narratives, discourses, and 
counter narratives produced in each, a heuristic pattern on overall support and opposition, 
narrative and counter narrative from each actor can be drawn out and shown in a wider 
structure. This analysis comes mainly in the confluences and divergences between each 
actor, and how exactly the culturally hegemonic actors presented each event and how the 
far right reported on each event, discerning them as intertwined texts. First from this 
paradigm comes the presentation of the cultural hegemon’s proxy in this research, 
RaiNews. RaiNews, in every single event, constructs either a depoliticized narrative of 
each event in the vein of the post-liberal, and if RaiNews does politicize any of the events 
– as in the case of FC Lazio Anne Frank scandal and the German Imperial flag scandal – 
this politicization comes from a view of these events acting as transgressions against the 
neoliberal substratum of the hegemony as a whole. Nonetheless, the far right 
presentations of these events display more of a depth of contestation, which is more telling 
for the purposes of this thesis.  
Discerned as a semi-unitary actor, for every single one of the analyzed events, the 
institutional accounts of the far right of LN and FdI and of the parties’ candidates for 
prime minister presented complementary and parallel narratives. For Macerata, they both 
focused on the Mastropietro murder – making it equal to immigration policies, only after 
a brief recognition of Traini’s shooting spree. In the case of the Rimini rape, they both 
presented a similar narrative strategy – this rape would not have occurred if the state had 
not pursued such immigration policies. For the Milan Starbucks protests, LN and FdI both 
expressed the same general exasperation and sarcastic opposition to the restyling 
installation. For both the FC Lazio Anne Frank scandal and the German Imperial flag 
scandal, the party and personal accounts form LN and FdI remained completely silent – 
although not ignorant – of either event.  
Nonetheless, Il Populista of LN – as a media source in its own right – constructed its own 
narratives in a fashion incredibly similar to the extreme right in the form of Il Primato 
Nazionale, which would link the electorally successful far right to the extreme right of 
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CPI. While in the case of the German Imperial flag scandal the party account of LN and 
Salvini’s personal account provided no narrative construction, Il Populista presented a 
complementary discourse to that of CPI. Il Populista, in this fashion, operated as a 
bridging actor between LN and FdI and the extreme right of CPI. As Salvini acts as the 
co-editor of the news site, at least in name, this shows that therein exists a spectrality of 
narrative constructions within the far right itself.   
This being said, CPI – representing the extreme or fringe of the far right – always 
responded to every single issues and in this way always presented a counter narrative in 
response to culturally hegemonic narrative characterized by the form of that of RaiNews. 
Il Primato Nazionale even provided linguistic justifications – “vigilantism” – for Traini’s 
shooting spree in Macerata when the other actors of the far right would focus solely on 
the Mastropietro murder. As such, CPI can be viewed as an aberration in the case of the 
far right as a counter hegemony, with more extreme views and discourses, one that can 
be either ignored or operationalized by other more electorally successful actors, such as 
LN, in those situations wherein it proves useful to do so. Such an instance of this can be 
discerned as in the offer of support from CPI’s di Stefano to a LN government, to which 
Salvini responded “after the fifth [of March], I’ll consider everything.”113 While for the 
elections, such an alliance with CPI was not considered by Salvini, the possibility of such 
a connection nonetheless existed.   
Such a chasm between the far right of the election and the extreme right of the discourse 
displays that within the counter hegemony itself, there is present its own material 
hierarchy, such as that between the cultural hegemony and the counter hegemony in a 
societal totality. Even within the representative body of the counter hegemony, the 
cleavages between the constructions of each event shows that even what could be 
considered an overall counter hegemonic actor – in this case, the Italian far right – 
diverges in their own internal discourses and narratives, and form their own center (LN, 
FdI) and their own periphery (CPI). Whether or not this would constituted something 
akin to a cultural hegemony within the party family of the Italian far right is a question 
                                                     
113 La Repubblica. “CasaPound: "Pronti a sostenere un governo Salvini". E il leader leghista risponde: 
"Dopo il 5 incontro tutti."” 26 February 2018. 
http://www.repubblica.it/speciali/politica/elezioni2018/2018/02/26/news/casapound_governo_salvini-
189827325/?refresh_ce.  
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for other research, but from these preliminary results of this thesis, the situation looks as 
such. Nonetheless, each presentation by LN, FdI, and CPI reinforced their identifications 
as far right actors, considering that every single narrative was constructed using a mixture 
of nativist, populist, and authoritarian elements.  
Most importantly, the fact of the matter is that in every single event, the far right both had 
the opportunity and capitalized upon the discursive space afforded to them by social 
media in order to create an alternative – and sometimes counter – narrative to that which 
the cultural hegemony provided on its own. As the anarchic discursive space of the 
internet and digital media has therefore afforded a dual character to the sphere of media, 
which can now no longer be hermeneutic, enclosed, and censoring of aberrant narratives 
from that which is willed by the cultural hegemon, the entire idea of the cultural hegemon 
has been problematized.  
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Does the mere utterance of “Macerata” draw an association with Traini’s anti-migrant 
shooting rampage or Pamela’s brutal murder? Was the flag in the Florentine barracks a 
signification of Prussian military tradition or neo-Nazis in the police force? From the 
discursive results of this study, the answer to both questions is simple and resounding 
affirmation. Since the realm of social media in the proxy of Twitter offered equal 
discursive space to both the culturally hegemonic and counter hegemonic actors, 
culturally hegemonic narratives and discourses coexist with the counter hegemonic ones 
even if they represent the other’s antithesis.  
From all of the results, can the hypothesis of the research question find a suitable answer, 
and does online media affect the ability of counter hegemony challenge to hegemonic 
control? The working hypothesis to this question has been answered in the affirmative, 
as within each of these events the far right has created its own narrative that in each case 
provided an alternative or counter narrative. Even with such events such as the FC Lazio 
Anne Frank scandal and German Imperial flag scandal not garnering a response from 
some institutional actors of the far right, at least one representative party – namely CPI 
in every case – provided an alternative or counter narrative in response to that which was 
put forward by RaiNews. 
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The findings of this thesis, consequentially, have broad implications for the fundaments 
of the theory of cultural hegemony in the first place. Since the media – due primarily to 
the proliferation of digital and social media – has now been afforded with a dual, hybrid 
character, this would make the entire structure of cultural hegemony a hybrid in itself, as 
two of its three constituent structural institutions for the manufacture of consent have a 
hybrid character in its own right – media. It follows from this logic of hybridity – or 
perhaps in this case, chimerism might more fittingly describe the actual paradigm – that 
cultural hegemony and its counter hegemony cannot be viewed as distinct, separated 
subjects. The anarchic conditions within social media and digital do not grant what would 
have previously been a centrality of the cultural hegemony to its counter hegemony 
periphery, and due to this state of affairs, both are presented in the sphere of social media 
on the same level for their discourses, regardless of basis on fact, morality, ethics, or any 
overarching truth. Social and online media has allowed the far right to be its own 
gatekeeper in terms of discourse, free of any hegemonic censorship, to use the 
“gatekeeper” description of media from Gamson and Wolfsfeld. In this digital sphere, the 
cultural hegemony and the counter hegemony are still interconnected and interdependent 
as they still utilize the same referent objects, but at the same time, they are nonetheless 
afforded the exact same opportunities for narrative construction, and both wider groups 
are able to engage with each other or ignore each other as willed.  
6.1 Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is in its focus on Italy as the subject of analysis. The 
social conditions, historicity of its political actors and domestic symbolic connotations, 
and its placement within wider global structures and institutions forces the results of this 
study to find its applicability only to the case of Italy. The reason for this selection, 
initially, was to test the Gramscian understanding of cultural hegemony in a contemporary 
context on Gramsci’s original subject for his theory. However, the results nonetheless 
warrant further research, applying the same methodology and theoretical testing of 
narrative research to other historical periods, other states, and other institutional actors in 
order to see if such phenomena could be universally instead of locally applicable.  
While not as much a limitation as a word of caution, social and online media – while 
important and illustrative of many ongoing processes that would have remained hidden 
otherwise – are nonetheless just one integral piece of a much larger mosaic of mechanisms 
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affecting these contemporary transformations in the conceptualization of hegemony. As 
with the limitation in the focus on Italy, these findings on the role of social and online 
media need to be integrated into wider interpretations in other research to test their 
validity in terms of universality and impact outside of simply the proof that social media 
affords a space of contestation.    
6.2 Final Words 
Even with such limitations taken into account, this research on the relationship between 
the cultural hegemony and the counter hegemony in the sphere of online media has shown 
that the actual situation is far more complex than a simple dichotomy between the two, if 
the two can even be considered unitary actors at this point. Social media, whether or not 
it has caused this bifurcation, has nonetheless rendered it possible to discern such a 
branching outward. Hypothetically, in a democratic society such as Italy, both the 
discourses of the cultural hegemony and the counter hegemony could be accessed by 
anyone, providing a choice in narrative, a selection in which discourse would be more 
suitable to an individual. The mere existence of this choice contests the consent produced 
by the cultural hegemony in the first place.  
The former consent production has shifted to a consent contestation, which while this 
situation does not inherently deny the possibility of the reproduction of the values and 
discourses of the cultural hegemony, it provides for the possibility for the individual to 
deny such discourses and values due to a mechanism within the structure of cultural 
hegemony itself, i.e., media. Future studies on cultural hegemony and any periphery 
societal actors, such as the far right, must consider such enveloping circumstances going 
forward, or at least as long as social media remains in its current stead, ceteris paribus.    
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CasaPoundItalia. (2018, 3 February). “"Il gesto dello squilibrato che a Macerata ha 
aperto il fuoco sugli stranieri va condannato senza esitazioni, si tratta di un atto 
criminale per cui non ci sono giustificazioni". La nota di Gianluca Iannone, 
presidente di CasaPound.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/CasaPoundItalia/status/959843034404933632. 
CasaPoundItalia. (2018, 11 February). “Simone Di Stefano sui fatti di Macerata e i cori 
choc sulle foibe.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/CasaPoundItalia/status/962712415023575040. 
diStefanoTW. (2017, 3 December) “@lucatelese @OGiannino Se non va bene (e non va 
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